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CONTRACTS, CAPABILITY, AND THE
CLASSROOM
James C. Oldham*
THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW. By Richard
Danzig. Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press. 1978. Pp. x,
254. $6.25.
Professor Danzig introduces his collection of readings on
well-known contract cases with a pleasing metaphor. Most of
traditional law school training, he says, deals with the engines of
our legal system, their characteristics and values. But those engines traverse a road that is often rutted and sometimes barely
passable. Danzig states: "The machinery of Justice responds as
much to the road as to the engine. This book is about the road"

(p. 2).

To describe the obstacles with which the road is strewn, Danzig has fashioned the term "capability problems." Principally he
investigates these problems in the courtroom and in the_ events
leading up to and following litigation. They constitute the systemic imperfections that deprive many individuals of access to
the litigative process, that cause the process itselfto·go awry, and
perhaps most importantly, that render courtroom victories
pyrrhic because the judgments cannot be enforced.
The pretrial imperfections are best illustrated in the final
section of the book-Allen v. Quality Furniture (p. 205). That
episode, which did not reach trial, graphically describes the hopeless quagmire that can be encountered in striving to solve through
the litigative process what would seem to be simple consumer
problems. Appropriately, the supplementary comments to the
section commence with a quote from Dicken's Bleak House. 1
The testimonial problems in the courtroom are treated in
Parts I and VI: Part I presents a malpractice suit and Part VI a
• Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. B.S. 1962, Duke University; L.L.B.
1965, Stanford University; M.S.B.A. 1967, University of Denver.-Ed.
·
1. This is the Court of Chancery, which has its decaying houses and its
blighted lands in every shire, which has its worn-out lunatic in every madhouse and
its dead in every churchyard, which has its ruined suitor with his slipshod heels arid
threadbare dress borrowing and begging through the round of every man's acquaintance, which gives to monied might the means abundantly of wearying out the right,
which so exhausts finances, patience, courage, hope, so overthrows the brain and
breaks the heart, that there is not an honourable man among its practitioners who
would not give-who does not often give-the warni~g, "Suffer any wrong that can
be done you rather than come here!" [P. 223]
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suit involving mental incapacity to enter into a contract. 2 Posttrial judgment collection problems are best illustrated in Parts II
and V, cases dealing with injunctive relief on a convenant not to
compete and collection under a contract tainted by illegality. 3
The rest of the book deals with the measurement and award of
damages. To illustrate the problem of assessing damages, Danzig
uses two universally familiar contract cases: Hadley u. Baxendale4 and Jacob & Youngs u. Kent. 5
Except for the final section of the book (where the case did
not generate a court opinion), Danzig's scheme is to present the
reported appellate opinion in the case, to follow the report with
"first questions," then to provide supplementary comments delving into the trial phase of the case or into background facts, and
to conclude with "further questions." Although the quality and
depth of the various studies are uneven, the concept of the book
is an appealing one, especially when viewed as an augmentation
to a standard casebook.
Each of the case studies is interspersed with a variety of
"capability problems." Sometimes these are quite simplistic-for
example, the admonition that cases can be won or lost depending
upon the quality of the lawyering. 6 At other times, the meaning
is subtle-for example, the treatment of the reliance damage
component in the O'Connor case,7 or the suggestion that capability problems infect the analyses of the Chicago school of economics just as they do the litigation process. 8 At still other times,
sweeping questions are posed which suggest the outlines of Hart
and Sacks's materials on legal process. 9
Floating through these exercises is the repeated message that
"the law in action will be different from the law on the books." 10
To imbue students with an appreciation of this message in some
2. The cases are respectively, Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183
(1973); Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 25 N.Y.2d 196, 250 N.E.2d 460, 303
N.Y.S.2d 362 (1969).
3. Respectively, Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 270 Wis. 133, 70 N.W.2d 585
(1955); Karpinski v. Collins, 252 Cal. App. 2d 711, 60 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1967).
4. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
5. 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921).
6. See, e.g., Further Questions 4, 5, and 8 following the Supplementary Comments
to Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 679, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973) [at pp. 42-43).
7. Further Question 5 (p. 43).
8. See Further Question 3 following the Supplementary Comments to Hadley v.
Baxendale (p. 107).
9. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (Tent. Ed. 1958).
10. The quote is Professor Danzig's paraphrase of a statement by Karl Llewellyn (p.
2).
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depth is surely Danzig's principal goal.
Danzig may be saying merely, like Llewellyn and the legal
realists, 11 that he is a "law school realist" and wants the law
student to know the full contours of the game at an early stage.
The impetus is the same as, or is similar to, the widespread movement some years ago in contracts casebooks to start with remedies.12 Danzig's theme, however, is more basic. He seeks to reveal
the arbitrariness, the fortuities, the surprises, the obstacles, and
the skills that attend the crystallization of events into litigation.
He then observes the slips between cup and lip in the litigation
process itself and the frequent disintegration of the achieved result.
I have no quarrel with these objectives. My only worry is that
the student not be demoralized completely. There really are lawsuits that succeed, just as there is occasionally successful, egalitarian legislation. Danzig asks the student to appraise an appellate judge's opinion in the first exercise and to assess whether it
is "an over-subtle, pedantic, meaningless exercise" (p. 43). He
then asks whether, if so, law school education can be similarly
characterized, suffering as it is from an inbreeding of opinions of
appellate judges selected in part by law professors (p. 43). These
are legitimate questions, although they are hardly new ones. All
who teach traditional casebook courses in the first year of legal
education are conscious of the skewed impression left by the exclusive attention to common-law cases-often bad ones, at that. 13
The trouble is that Danzig, after raising this problem repeatedly,
gives the student very little countervailing support. No rehabilitation of student morale is provided, other than the quixotic gratifications reflected in the consumer fraud problem at the end of
the book. The possibility emerges that Danzig is, in fact, an antitheorist, inviting students to conclude that contract doctrine is
empty. Such a nihilist viewpoint would have been de rigueur a
decade ago, but it is surprising and a little disappointing to encounter it from as fresh and spirited a member of the contracts
11. See K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE (1962); w. TwlNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE
REALIST MOVEMENT (1974).
12. For example, Professor Jackson proposes: "[B]y studying remedies first, a student will learn to 'keep his eye on the ball', i.e., attention will be appropriately focused
on the lawyer's end-goal of a result that predictably can be obtained if the transaction or
relationship becomes subject to litigation." J. JACKSON, CONTRACT LAw IN MODERN Soc1ETY
12 (1973). Danzig's materials, of course, put into question the predictability to which
Jackson refers.
13. See, e.g., Henderson, Book Review, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1466, 1467 (1976) (reviewing C. REITZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS AS BASIC COMMERCIAL LAw (1975)).
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community as Professor Danzig. 14
Perhaps I overreact. After all, only a few years ago Danzig
took Karl Llewellyn to task about what Danzig perceived to be
the doctrinal and moral vacuity of Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code. 15 Thus, Danzig's mission in his readings on contracts cases may be limited to describing the inevitable tension
between the artifice of theory and the reality of trial. In this, his
materials are successful.
Having unburdened myself about what I regard as the ·only
truly disturbing feature of the book, I will turn to some of the
specific case studies. In doing so, I will save the Hadley v.
Baxendale piece until last, since that study stands apart in considerable measure.
The story of Alice Sullivan's cosmetic nose operations reflected in malpractice litigation captures the reader's attention
quickly and provides a good opening case study. It is challenging,
in that the supplementary comments invite the students' attention to the following: (1) the fact that the winning theory of the
case was selected by the lawyers almost accidently; (2) the highly
untheoretical recollections of jury members, whose decisions were
frequently at odds with jury instructions or the weight of the
evidence; (3) the difficulty in distilling clear facts from ambiguous testimony; and (4) the extent to which testimonial expressions in a courtroom are influenced by factors completely extraneous to the case. These topics could easily spawn many reflective· hours on the part of the student. Helping to channel and
particularize this reflection are the "further questions," which
are, on the whole, appropriately provocative. Occasionally, however, a further question is so broad that it may lose its utility. For
example, Danzig instructs the student to do a legal autopsy on
the Sullivan case and asks: "What lessons do you draw from [the
materials] that might be relevant to your performance as an
attorney? What capability problems arise as a result of the vari14. Professor Henderson has recently noted that "[j]udging from the advance sheets
and the casebook marketplace, there is as yet scant evidence that salvation for the con•
tracts course lies in some form of antidoctrine." Id. at 1469. Supporting Professor Henderson's statement is Gilmore, Frederick Kessler, 84 YALE L.J. 672, 681 (1975). In that engaging piece, Professor Gilmore lauds his colleague Kessler as "one of the very few men of
his generation who, having decisively rejected the doctrinal orthodoxy of the period-the
Restatement of Contracts and all that-seems never to have been tempted to go on to
some form of antidoctrine as salvation." Id. Professor Gilmore observes, by the way, a
resurgence of theoretical inquiry in the contracts literature during the 1970s.
15. Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27
STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975).
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ance in lawyers' skills?" (p. 42).
Sometimes this unproductive breadth of the questions filters
into the "first questions" following the report of the appellate
decision. I find this to be true of the qgestions following the second case study, Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg. 16 Danzig directs
the student to '.'imagine" all the capability problems inherent in
the situation presented by the case. It will be the rare first-year
student who can do it; most students will not have the speculative
ability or the experience to be able to respond meaningfully. Students can muse about the problems, to be sure, and such musings
may be valuable in their way, but I think more helpful, particularized questions could be fashioned. 17
To my mind the case study which is the least effective is that
dealing with Jacob & Youngs v. Kent. I do not find the supplementary comments to be a particularly illuminating addition to
the facts recited in the appellate opinion, and the "further questions" are little different from the standard series of questions one
would pursue in analyzing Judge Cardozo's reasoning. 18
To some extent the same is true of the Karpinski v. Collins 19
study (pp. 129-47). The supplementary comments comprise a
nice story providing a background to the case, but few additional
insights are contributed. It is valuable, however, to learn from the
supplementary comments of the case how the collection of the
judgment was encroached upon by the bankruptcy proceedings
against the corporate entity operated by the defendants.
·
Danzig's treatment of Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement
Board 20 describes the occasion prompting the California Supreme
Court to "modernize" its approach to mental incapacity as a
basis for avoiding contractua;l obligations. I have taught the case
three times, and it is a wonderful one for first-year students.
16. 270 Wis. 133, 70 N.W.2d 585 (1955).
17. To illustrate, the first part of Danzig's third question about Fullerton is as follows:
"Criticize the rule of law articulated by the Supreme Court in terms of the capability
problems it will encounter" (p. 42). Would it not be more helpful to particularize this?
For example: How will the court in future cases be able to decide how much protection
from competition a plaintiff 'needs'? What does 'need' mean? Should it be established
under generally accepted accounting principles? How much of a hypothetical diminution
in profits would be required? What type of proof will be adequate to establish the necessary causal link between a future diminution in profits and a breach of a covenant not to
compete?
18. For an especially potent set of inquiries about the Cardozo opinion, one laced with
excursions into the background of New York law, see F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS
898-901 (1970).
19. 25 N.Y.2d 196, 250 N.E.2d 460, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1969).
20. 252 Cal. App. 2d 711, 60 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1967).
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Danzig's supplementary material, as in the Alice Sullivan case,
highlights the contrast between murky testimony and the confident language and system of categorization in the appellate opinion.
The final selection in the book I have previously alluded
to-Allen v. Quality Furniture Co. The facts are strikingly similar
to those before Judge Skelly Wright in Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co., 21 except that the Quality Furniture facts
never reached a litigated conclusion. A simulated interview is
effectively done, and Danzig does not fail to compare the honest,
forthright testimony of the uneducated Mrs. Allen with that of
the devious Alice Sullivan, the dull-witted Mr. Ortelere and the
incapacitated Mrs. Ortelere (p. 221). Following the simulated
interview is a descriptive piece by Phil Schrag, which derives
from his experience as an attorney for the National Office for the
Rights of the Indigent. The piece is gripping. Highly suspenseful,
the episode cannot fail to be illuminating, even to the most streetwise first-year law student. It is worthwhile to be privy to the
formative stages of a test case, the strategy chosen, and the discovery phase, particularly when the test case attacks some of the
unsavory features of commercial-credit practices in Harlem.
Whether the story belongs in a first-year contracts course is debatable but largely academic; the contracts course is as good a
first-year setting as any. For me, the only troubling aspect of the
episode, the book's final selection, is the same difficulty raised by
the first selection-that the first-year student may have been
unduly demoralized by contract th~ory.
I come, finally, to Professor Danzig's analysis of Hadley u.
Baxendale. Originally a legal history study, 22 this chapter of Danzig's book is elaborately analytical-far more so than the other
case studies. It is true that Danzig's study of Hadley reveals
forces shaping the result that are largely invisible to the contemporary reader of the reported case, and in this way, he is dealing
with "capability problems" as he has defined them. But his chief
mission is that of an historiographer.
What Danzig does with Hadley is to examine the state of
industrialization at the time of the case, to explore the characteristics and backgrqund of the counsel in the case and of the judges
deciding the case on appeal, and to suggest plausible hypotheses
21. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
22. Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the /,aw, 2 J.
LEGAL 8nm. 249 (1975).

Jan.-Mar. 1979]

Contracts and Capability

955

about why the case has loomed so large in contracts literature
over the years. He also concludes that the case has outlived its
importance. The insights provided the first-year law student by
his analyses are valuable, both intrinsically and in terms of the
importance of assessing a case in the context of the time and
place in which it arose.
There are, nevertheless, several features of the study which
are troublesome. Danzig seems to go out of his way to quibble
with Professor A.W.B. Simpson, a contracts historian at the
University of Kent, Canterbury. At issue between Danzig and
Simpson is who in the Hadley drama most clearly relied on civillaw treatise writers, Pothier and Sedgwick in their approach to
damages. This exercise, while perhaps common in papers by historians striving for a correct interpretation of a historical event,
seems out of place in these selected readings for contracts students. 23
In Part IV of his article on Hadley, Danzig attempts to demonstrate that changes in the judicial system in England in the
mid-1800s probably led to an increase in contracts litigation in
the lowest courts-the county courts-which were courts of limited jurisdiction. Danzig suggests that it would follow that questions of damages in contracts cases became more important because of the need to fix a jurisdictional amount in controversy.
The theory is interesting, although the proof offered in support
of the theory is scant. With regard to the Hadley case, Danzig
extends his theory as follows:
By identifying the criteria by which damages were to be assessed, the Hadley v. Baxendale court enhanced the predictability
of damages and therefore the correct allocation of cases between
the systems. Moreover, since the rule of the case coupled this en23. Even granting the appropriateness of the passage to this book, the content of the
quarrel is peculiar. Danzig states that Professor Simpson was short-sighted in concluding
that Baron Parke was the principal actor in the Hadley drama to consult the civil law.
Baron Parke admitted his own reliance upon Sedgwick, but Danzig indicates that it
"seems clear" that Baxendale's flamboyant counsel, Willes, also was familiar with and
relied upon the civil-law writers (p. 83). This speculative conclusion is then transformed
by Danzig into a "fact that Willes had read Pothier and especially Sedgwick" (p. 83).
Professor Danzig next states what he regards as a more significant fault with Professor
Simpson's thesis-that Simpson stops short in his analysis. Danzig suggests that Baron
Parke's resort to the civil law must have been symptomatic of underlying dissatisfaction
with the existing law, and Danzig searches for that underlying dissatisfaction. By this
means, Danzig effects a smooth transition between Parts II and III of his article on Hadley,
but perhaps he does so at the expense of Professor Simpson. There is no indication that
Professor Simpson's goals in his references to Hadley were coextensive with Professor
Danzig's.
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hanced predictability with an assertion of limitations on recovery,
it tended to shunt cases from the Superior Courts toward the
County Courts and thus to protect the smaller system from at least
a portion of the workload that if untrammelled would overwhelm
it. [P. 93]

I find this suggestion highly speculative. It is not supported
by statistical evidence. The only statistics offered are that the
county court caseload grew from 429,000 cases in 1846 to 754,000
in 1857. This was a major· increase, to be sure, but it seems dubious to me that a significant impetus to the expansion was the
1854 decision in Hadley, particularily given the time needed for
Hadley to be felt in newly litigated cases.
Two other aspects of Danzig's Hadley u. Baxendale article
give me pause. First, in discussing the jury in Hadley, Danzig
notes that nine of the twelve were merchants "who must have
suffered frustration or injury from the then-frequent occurrence
of carrier error," and thus that these merchants "probably sympathized much more readily with the Hadleys than with Baxendale" (p. 94). Admittedly a certain amount of dissatisfaction surfaced during the mid- and early 1800s with special juries comprised of m·erchants, dissatisfaction largely due to the allegation
that the composition of special merchant juries was subject to
unchecked manipulation. 24 There was considerable evidence to
suggest that this practice was occurring, 25 but presumably Baxendale could play the game as well as the Hadleys-particularly
given the skill of Baxendale's counsel, Willes (pp. 83, 97). Thus,
I do not think it fruitful to surmise whether the jurors were likely
to be more sympathetic to the Hadleys than to Baxendale.
Secondly, Danzig evaluates the "notice" requirement of
Hadley (that a breaching party will be responsible for special
damages only if he was put on notice at the time the contract was
entered into of the condition that might lead to such damages)
and concludes that this feature of the case was, even when
crafted, anachronistic. He points out that "in mass transaction
situations a seller cannot plausibly engage in an individualized
'contemplation' of the consequences of breach and a subsequent
tailoring of a transaction" (p. 100). And Pickford's, the carrier,
24. See, e.g., Bentham, On the Art of Packing Special Juries (1821), in 5 THE WORKS
BENTHAM 61 (1843); WooLER, AN APPEAL TO THE CmzENS OF LoNDON AGAINST
THE ALI.EDGED LAWFUL MODE OF PACKING SPECIAL JURIES (1817).
25. See, e.g., "Report of the Especial Committee to Examine the Books and Lists of
Persons Qualified to Serve on Juries in and for the City of London," Common Council
Minutes, 11 December 1817; "Report from the Select Committee on Special and Common
Juries," House of Commons, 7 July 1868.
oF JEREMY
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is described as an "enormous mercantile establishment" with
innumerable departments working largely autonomously (p. 100).
How much more so is this true today of corporate enterprise: Yet
the law continually engages in "notice" requirements, indulging
iii the fiction that a sprawling corporate entity has "knowledge"
of and is therefore responsible for the acts of all its widely dissemipated agents. 26 Danzig states that the fragmented and standardized nature of contemporary business makes it "self-evidently
impossible to serve legally cognizable noti<!e on, for example, an
airline that a scheduled flight is of special importance or the
telephone company that uninterrupted service is particularly
vital at a particular point in a firm's business cycle" (p. 101). Yet
there continue to be cases of liability for special damages in transmission of messages and like situations. n
In fairness, Danzig does point out that the court's factual
determination in Hadley that the defendant did not know that
the mill was shut down may have been prompted by uncertainty
in the law of agency. The court may have assumed that a "mere
notice" to an agent could not bind the principal (p. 87). This
doubt has long since disappeared, and perhaps had it disappeared prior to Hadley, the court would have been more concerned about the implications of its "notice" requirement.
Conclusion
I have always told my contracts students that, like truth. the
appearance of certainty in the law may be as important as certainty itself. Having scrutinized cases with them until the cases
crumble under our gaze, we strive to pull back a bit to realize
that, with the proper perspective, the subject matter is intact and
reasonably well integrated. Danzig's book is, he says, about the
ruts in the road which the contracts vehicle traverses. On the
whole, Danzig develops his theme ably, and it is a perspective
infrequently emphasized in law school. My caution is merely to
remember that the road is passable, and while this may be in
part due to the yielding nature of the obstacles described by
26. A contemporary example under the Uniform Commercial Code is the machinery
of§ 2-207, especially § 2-207(2)(c). Under that provision, a merchant may be bound by
additional terms contained in the other party's expression of acceptance unless
"notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable
time after notice of them is received."
27. See Judge Cardozo's discussion in Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 245
N.Y. 284, 157 N.E. 140 (1927) and cases collected and discussed in A. CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs
~§ 1018, 1076 (1964).
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Danzig, it is due as well to the resilience and durability of the
doctrinal engines.

